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This newly built rail link is a paper tiger. It is so open to a missile or air attack that it would be foolish for the Chinese military to consider it as a vital supply link. Bridges and tunnels in large number on this route could be targeted by Indian Brahmos cruise missiles. Rebuilding them would be a long process. In addition, the hostile Tibetan populace could make it impossible for this rail link to function.
China maintains about 16 to 18 divisions in Tibet, facing India in Arunachal Pradesh and Akash Chin in Kashmir. A minor disposition of troops is maintained in the central sector to safeguard supply routes. In all, 240,000 men are lightly equipped mountain divisions, foot mobile and very vulnerable to heavily equipped Indian troops across the Himalayas. China's more heavily armed troops are retained in Chengdu military district, 800 miles away.
The Chinese air force is a bulky, poor quality force. It has a very limited number of high performance aircraft from Russia. The Chinese have reverse engineered a few Russian and American models, but these copies are poor quality. Most of these aircraft are deployed opposite Taiwan. Even if some were relocated to the Indian border, they would have trouble landing and taking off at elevations of 7,000 to 8,000 feet, with their full complement of armaments in Tibet. That makes it difficult for them to match Indian fighter aircraft.
China's navy faces certain death, including its aircraft carriers and their nuclear submarines, if they venture far away from their homeports. In any India-China war, it is unlikely that the West would either stay neutral or go to the Chinese side. They would be delighted if the Chinese navy suffered a major reverse at the hands of the Indians. This they could ensure by providing timely information to India on its movements.
Hence, it would boil down to a fight between China's lightly equipped infantry and India's medium to lightly equipped infantry. The army with superior tactics, knowledge of the ground and high-tech surveillance would carry the day. The last military match in 1962 went to China, as Indians were poorly equipped and poorly deployed.
The Chinese know the Indian military advancements well. They also know about their own vulnerability in Tibet. In the last ten years, when they increased their defense expenditures substantially in Tibet, they built four new airfields and several new missile bases. This in fact has bolstered their offensive capability, but it also made them targets to tactical theater missiles.
China spends US$90 billion in defense-related expenditures every year. It admits to only US$50 billion. The rest is hidden in secret state security operations and development projects unrelated to the military. Also a bulk is spent on nuclear submarines, nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers to match the West. Although China's military expenditure at US$45 billion is huge, yet consider this: China has to support an army of 2.5 million men, an Air Force of 3,000 old aircraft and a navy of 250,000 men, with 45 submarines, destroyers, battle cruisers and other naval craft. Considering the size of the military forces, this much expenditure is about average.
Until 1995, Chinese ground forces and air force were equipped with 1950s-era hardware all supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviets withdrew all military support from China after the Chinese demanded the return of large tracts of land from the Soviet Union. The Ussiri River military clashes followed. This falling out was never repaired. Hence the Chinese were stuck with old and very old hardware until about 1995. Modernization is now underway, but modernizing a 2.5 million force is a long and tedious job, especially when no modern hardware is available for purchase.
China's current military commitments are also large. The country has stationed 20 percent of its forces on the China-Russia border. The other 30 percent are stationed opposite Taiwan, together with the bulk of their high-tech hardware. Of the remaining 50 percent of its forces, about 50 percent are reserves (about 20 divisions) and the remaining forces face India and other Southeast Asian neighbors like Vietnam, Myanmar, and Thailand.
Hence it is not a very large force that faces India.
China does have one advantage -- Chinese troops and garrisons are very close to the India-Tibet border. This will allow them to reinforce their border guards very quickly. They could maintain huge pressure on India's forward positions. That would give them a huge psychological advantage. The disadvantage would be that depleting the reserves in Tibet would be an invitation to Tibetan rebels to take advantage. India would surely help.
Facing all this, India has equipped a total of eight mountain divisions, with four more that could easily convert to mountain warfare. These are foot mobile and are larger in strength than their Chinese counterparts. They are trained in mountain and snow warfare. Their equipment is a couple of shades heavier than that of the Chinese. These troops are stationed a bit farther away from the border, which is a disadvantage. But the Indian border guards occupy high ground, which would be an advantage in a defensive battle. They could hold the line until the bulk of the army arrived.
Overall India spends about US$22 billion a year on its defense forces, which number about 1.1 million and 600 combat aircraft and two dozen submarines, two aircraft carriers and a multitude of other vessels. About 50 percent of India's defense commitments are Pakistan-related. The remaining 50 percent are divided between protecting the border with China, internal security and reserves. India's military hardware is a bit more sophisticated. These are not reverse-engineered copies but the real thing, hence a bit superior. Israel has been India's conduit for sophisticated hardware. Other sophisticated hardware is procured through open bidding.
The road networks on both the Indian and the Chinese sides are not well developed. The Chinese, because they were on a plateau, would find themselves at an advantage in reaching the border compared to the Indians. That again would be a psychological advantage.
The situation would change immediately if India vacated its isolated forward positions in favor of a better defensive line and waited for the Chinese. If the Chinese did come, they would immediately suffer the disadvantage of distance from their supply bases, with the mountains in between. This would neutralize their numbers advantage.
Indian tactical missiles, if cleverly placed, could play havoc to the Chinese supply lines. The Tibetan plateau is open and treeless without cover.
India's combat-ready Air Force is more than a match for anything the Chinese could throw at the Indians. The Indians come from bases which are at about sea level and carry heavier combat loads. These bases are located well within 300 to 400 miles of the India-China border.
The same advantage does not exist for the Chinese. First their fighter planes are inferior, second they cannot carry their full payload as the available runway length at elevations of 7,000 to 9,000 feet limits the payload, and third the airbases are in open area and could be constantly monitored by Indian AWACS. Hence the Chinese would fight a defensive air war. This would be an advantage for India.
In short, China would fight a highly unsuccessful military campaign should they ever think of a rematch with India. The Indians are much better prepared today than in 1962. The military dispositions of India and China are evenly matched in Tibet, with the Indians having an equipment advantage. No walkover like in 1962 is possible now.
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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
