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If this statement had been made by a philosopher or religious personality it might be dismissed as simply another well-meaning yet impractical utterance. But if uttered by the head of government of the dominant world power, many more would surely take note. Gladstone was prime minister of Great Britain in the 1920s, in a time when Britain was wracked by the Irish rebellion that eventually culminated in the establishment of the Republic of Ireland.
Gladstone is remembered for his championing of “home rule" as the solution to the Irish question. He was farsighted enough to see a solution to a conflict that continued for another 80 years without being resolved in its entirety. The Irish question was finally resolved in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement, which held as its three pillars the laying down of referenda, power sharing and the disarmament of armed groups. The fact that it took nearly another decade to implement the Good Friday Agreement demonstrates the arduous process involved in solving protracted ethnic conflicts.
Still, Gladstone could not rally the rest of his government and its opposition to his side to resolve the problem in Ireland. His concept of home rule, which entailed the devolution of powers to Ireland, proved too controversial and divisive at that time. The Irish poet W. B. Yeats in his “Meditations in Time of Civil War” wrote, "We have fed the heart on fantasies, the heart's grown brutal from the fare, more substance in our enmities, than in our love."
Eventually, Great Britain was partitioned and the Republic of Ireland established itself independently of Great Britain. But the example set by William Gladstone in his pursuit of resolving internal conflicts was to prevail in the coming generation of British leaders.
If one may paraphrase Gladstone, the "power of love" is to include those perceived to be opponents and enemies, and not to exclude them. Through mistrust and refusing to negotiate on home rule, the British government effectively excluded the Irish nationalists. This eventually led to a complete separation. Learning its lesson, in the 1990s, the British government faced the challenge of rising nationalism in Scotland and Wales in a positive manner, and actively facilitated the establishment of autonomous and devolved units within the framework of a unified United Kingdom.
Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan experience of conflict resolution is full of examples of mistrust and exclusion. Currently there are very few examples of comprehensive inclusion. In 1997, the government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga produced a draft constitution that was superior to the existing constitution in its proposals for power sharing and the protection of human rights. But it was formulated as a tool to win over the Tamil people and to isolate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
In addition, the government was not able to allay the fears of the opposition that President Kumaratunga was simply trying to lengthen her tenure in office. As a result, the opposition bitterly opposed the draft constitution when it came before Parliament. These acts of political bad faith -- which seem to mirror the "love of power," to use Gladstone's term -- have eroded trust and the possibility of bipartisan government-opposition cooperation in the national interest.
Unfortunately, at the present time, Sri Lanka is journeying in the opposite direction as that of Northern Ireland. The government strategy of conflict resolution relies primarily on fighting militarily against the LTTE and defeating them. The war against the LTTE, and its enormous costs, are being justified on the basis that the LTTE is unprepared to enter into negotiations in which a political solution and disarmament are the goals.
There is validity in this observation, but it is only part of the truth. The other side of the matter is the repeated failures of governments to offer a credible political package as a solution to the ethnic conflict, which has only worked to marginalize the mainstream and moderate Tamil political parties.
Currently there are two political initiatives of the government that have the potential to be pillars of a peace process. One is the more complete implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution put forward by the All Party Conference as an interim solution. The government's success in bringing in the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the breakaway faction of the LTTE, into the Eastern Provincial Council, set up under the 13th Amendment, is an important first step. The next steps will be to devolve sufficient powers and resources to make the Provincial Council system work effectively, at least in the east.
The second governmental initiative has been the invitation extended to the TMVP to join the All Party Representative Committee and work with other political parties to arrive at a political package for a longer-term solution to the ethnic conflict. The government also needs to consider inviting the Tamil National Alliance, which is by far the largest Tamil political party in Parliament, to join the process.
The spirit of inclusiveness that the Northern Ireland peace process demonstrated suggests that the TNA, whose services are also utilized by the LTTE to get its political messages across, should be brought into the All Party process, similar to that experienced by the Sinn Fein in Britain. If the propaganda and expenditures being devoted to war are channeled into producing a credible and inclusive political package, the time of peace that William Gladstone anticipated will surely be closer at hand.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
