Font size: 
The departure of former JVP presidential candidate Nandana Gunathilaka from the party over a year ago, and his informal alliance with the government, did not appear to have done much damage to the party. However, the tussle that has emerged between Wimal Weerawansa, the demagogic spokesman and parliamentary group leader of the JVP and the rest of the JVP leadership seems to be of a different magnitude to the defection of Gunathilaka.
Not only has Weerawansa utilized his unique gifts as an emotional public speaker to engage in public histrionics against his erstwhile comrades, he has been successful in obtaining the support of about ten of the JVP's 38 parliamentarians. This figure fluctuates as some of them appear to be wavering, being seen on the rebel platform but also pledging their loyalty to the party.
Weerawansa and his supporters have stated that they intend to play an independent role in politics. This, however, is unlikely. The government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has shown itself to be extremely successful in winning over opposition politicians by offering them ministries to engage their creativity and also the perks and privileges of power.
Indeed the most serious cause for conflict appears to be with regard to the closeness of the relationship to the government. Wimal Weerawansa was one of the star performers who helped Rajapaksa to win the presidential election of 2005. He utilized his unparalleled ability to appeal to Sinhalese nationalism and to describe his targets of attack as traitors and Western stooges to maximum effect.
Among his more memorable utterances was a promise to regain the values of the Sinhalese nation that existed in 1505, before the Western powers made their inroads into the culture of the country. Together with President Rajapaksa he denounced the internationally facilitated Ceasefire Agreement as an unequal treaty that had the government on bended knees to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam although, by that time, it had brought nearly four years of respite from war.
Since its inception the primary motivation of the JVP has been to represent the interests of the underclass of society, particularly the marginalized sections of the majority Sinhalese population. The JVP emerged in the mid-1960s from the Maoist wing of the Communist Party, finding ready backing among Sinhalese rural youth unhappy with the lack of economic opportunities. It won support through its recruitment program and by organizing on university campuses.
In 1971 it launched an armed uprising, which the army crushed with the help of numerous foreign powers. Between 1977 and 1983, it re-emerged after what remained of the original leadership was released from jail. It then went underground and launched a new insurrection just as the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord was signed in 1987.
For a brief period in the 1980s the JVP also upheld the right of self-determination of the Tamil people in keeping with orthodox Marxist positions on the rights of national minorities. By holding to this position the JVP may have found it easier to forge links with the LTTE at that time, and allegedly obtain weapons from the LTTE for their own insurrection against the government that took place in the later 1980s. But by and large the JVP has been a Sinhalese nationalist party with a xenophobic attitude to the international community, including neighboring India.
On the other hand, the JVP's ideological commitment to representing the underclass of society has also induced it to sometimes take up commendable positions in favor of the ethnic minorities. The tsunami disaster that struck the Muslim-inhabited eastern part of the island in December 2004 saw the JVP invest heavily in immediate relief and rehabilitation work in those areas in a manner that rivaled the government and NGOs. The JVP's cadre-based party network helped in the sustained relief effort that earned the gratitude of the Muslim public at that time.
Another important occasion on which the JVP took a principled stance in favor of minority rights was when the government decided to evict Tamil residents who had temporary residences in Colombo on a mass scale in June 2007. This was in the aftermath of a spate of LTTE terror attacks in Colombo in which the security forces identified lodging houses as the bases of the LTTE strike forces.
Although the JVP was in full support of the government's military campaign to defeat the LTTE, it condemned the eviction of Tamils from Colombo. This positive stance of the JVP, together with the rest of the opposition and civil society, was one of the factors that encouraged the judiciary to courageously strike down the government order.
With the departure of Weerawansa, even if it is temporary, it is possible that the JVP will be able to delve more into the roots of its Marxist ideology to find the space for the rights of minorities. So far the JVP has only agreed to the decentralization of power, and has resisted even the less than substantial devolution of powers to the provinces under the 13th Amendment.
The party has been opposed to constitutional changes leading to a federal system, as it sees the demand for self-determination as inevitably leading to a "Balkanization" suited to foreign interests and inimical to more equitable redistribution by the unitary welfare state. As a result, its response to "the national question" is essentially limited to a military solution. On the other hand, JVP leaders have insisted that they stand for equality of all citizens. The slow progress of the war, and its heavy costs on the Tamil people and on the economy, might lead the JVP to be more committed to a political solution in which the traditional Marxist teachings can play a more important role.
--
(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
