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Much was expected of the APRC as it had 14 political parties represented in it, had commissioned a panel of experts to assist it, had met on 63 occasions and was chaired by a person with a proven track record of commitment to a negotiated political solution. But if transforming the military conflict to one of peaceful conflict resolution was the expectation, the outcome of the APRC manifested in its Jan. 23 proposal was disappointing to say the least.
The APRC's proposal was that the government should implement existing law in the form of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution that established the system of Provincial Councils with devolved powers in 1987. The proposal did not contain any concrete measures or principles of governance that would strengthen the Provincial Council system, which has become akin to a white elephant in terms of ethnic conflict resolution.
Ironically, the present APRC proposal is even less than the 13th Amendment. It is bereft of the temporary merger of the Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern provinces, which made the 13th Amendment a radical measure at that time. In addition, it is reported that power over finances, police, education and land is not to be devolved, as envisaged in the 13th Amendment, and despite speculation of the "full implementation" of the law. The only advance over the current implementation of the law therefore appears to be in the language provisions to improve the position of the Tamil language and recruit more Tamils to the public service.
About a month ago it was reported that President Mahinda Rajapaksa had summoned the APRC and handed it a proposal that it was constrained to accept. It should be noted that neither the major opposition party, the United National Party, nor the major Tamil political party, the Tamil National Alliance, was part of the APRC. As the APRC owes its very existence to the president whose initiative it was, it appears to have given the president's proposal pride of place. Political realities that give the president overwhelming power in relation to most of the members of the APRC appear to have prevailed.
Rajapaksa's actions in restricting the APRC proposals need to be seen in the light of the prevailing political situation. The government is engaged in a determined and costly effort to militarily defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and reduce their influence over the affairs of the country. But this is a strategy that can be sustained only if the government continues to receive support also from the Sinhalese nationalist parties in Parliament. Without their support, the government could possibly lose its majority in Parliament, which appears to be the dominant concern of the government.
Both the People's Liberation Front, or JVP, and the Jathika Hela Urumaya have negative attitudes toward the 13th Amendment and are opposed to anything more. The JVP's position is that the amendment is not legitimate, as it is a result of Indian pressure, and should not be implemented so long as the LTTE continues to fight militarily for a separate Tamil state. The JHU's position is that it opposes the 13th Amendment in principle, but will support the president's proposals in terms of the appropriate devolution of power.
The JHU, unlike the JVP, seems able to see the importance of the government maintaining a minimum level of credibility with the international community, in particular its Western component of which the JVP is bitterly critical. A major success of the present government has been its ability to prosecute a most costly and ruthless war against the LTTE while keeping the major international actors either quiet or on its side.
The Indian response to the APRC proposals suggests that the government's strategy has paid off, at least for the time being. While other foreign governments remained quiet, the Indian government immediately issued a double-edged statement. It described the APRC proposals, bereft in content though they were, as a welcome first step. But this was provided the proposals paved the way to a final settlement to the ethnic conflict that could be acceptable to all communities.
The most reassuring feature of the present situation is that the general population does not appear to be as xenophobic and narrow minded as the government's nationalist allies. Most people appear supportive of the government's efforts to put an end to the LTTE by military force, as they do not see in the LTTE's long-term conduct any possibility of a negotiated settlement that is both democratic and within the confines of a united country. However, these same people have not shut their minds to the need for a political solution that could bring peace to the country and justice to the Tamil people.
This past week I had occasion to travel to Matara, in the extreme south of the country and part of the Southern Province, which is believed to be the heartland of Sinhalese nationalism. Although it was a working day, nearly 200 persons, most of them community leaders, gathered for a meeting to establish a district peace committee. They came despite constant reports in most sections of the media and political propaganda that speak in a one-sided manner of military victory and the benefits of war. The space for creating awareness of the need for a just political solution to the ethnic conflict continues to remain open.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
