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Even so, his opponents have not given up their efforts to turn the situation around and consolidate their supporters. What has happened to these politicians who were once acclaimed by the Korean people as promising political reformists?
In reality, the government and Yullin-Uri Party of President Roh Moo-hyun have suffered a severe withdrawal of public support over the past few years, largely due to their failure to overcome social division and the resulting social instability in pursuing their economic policies. It now appears they have no chance of restoring public support.
Roh's ruling style and his "seriously arbitrary" decision making have been criticized by the Korean press and opposition politicians, who claim that his personality has made him an inept leader. It is true that his style has made the public uneasy at times, but this is not the most decisive factor in his loss of support.
Roh's first problem has been that the Korean press and his political adversaries have characterized his party and administration as "leftists," with a secret plan to turn over the country to North Korea, or as heavy market regulators that are not appropriate for a free market economy. This mixed characterization has created serious confusion among the Korean people; it has skewed their understanding of Roh's long-term policy goals and aggravated their feeling of insecurity.
Roh's government has accepted the main framework of the Sunshine Policy that former President Kim Dae-jung created and pursued in his relationship with North Korea. This approach has been severely criticized by opposition politicians, including the GNP, because it might contribute to the survival of North Korea's nuclear-military regime. Although this might sound true, the policy also took into account grave concerns over the destructive impact that the North's abrupt collapse could have on the South.
As for economic policy, Roh's administration has shifted its focus toward fair wealth distribution, aimed at restoring a balance between economic growth and fair distribution. The Korean economy has advanced in the past by placing its highest priority on growth.
However, Roh's belief in a balanced economy failed to win public confidence for two reasons. Firstly, there were disputes over this policy among Roh's supporters, including progressive groups, which did not have constructive advice to offer in the pursuit of this policy. Secondly, the increasing social division strongly influenced people to weigh economic growth against equal distribution of wealth.
Consequently, Roh's initial attempt to establish a unique Korean economic policy model that could support economic growth and wealth distribution seems to have burned out. His efforts have resulted in public anger and frustration, and accusations that he betrayed the people.
In addition to the problem of inaccurate characterization, the disappointing withdrawal of public support from Roh's government and the Yullin-Uri Party was caused by the party's founders' decision to independently form a new party by seceding from the Democratic Party. The Yullin-Uri Party also could not create new political support.
The Yullin-Uri Party, with which Roh has always sided, was formed by a group who separated from the Democratic Party and then absorbed other political partners. The secession was aimed at achieving new political goals.
In order to resolve the chronic problem of Korean political parties depending on their respective regional connections, the new party had to distance itself from the Democratic Party's regional base. Such connections have been the root of corruption in the parties' competitive pursuit of political power. The big picture in their minds has been political parties competing for power on the basis of policy battles.
However, the Yullin-Uri Party also had to give up its own regional stronghold in the southern Honam area. In addition, it had to create a new foundation to steal regional support from the opposition GNP in Gyungbook province. Though it had some success, the new approach based on policies fell short of drawing the expected support from the regions.
Roh's government and the Yullin-Uri Party were dealt a critical blow when the party was defeated in a by-election in April. This election was hugely significant, as it provided an effective indication of how the political situation would take shape ahead of the December presidential election. This defeat seemed to reinforce Roh's expectation that he and his reform party might not succeed in holding onto power.
Roh and his partners, still eager to pursue political reform, were left with two options; either to win this year's presidential election, or work toward maintaining their political power by winning a substantial number of seats in next year's National Assembly election. Of course it would be best if both options could be achieved at the same time. However, after the April by-election defeat, the first option no longer appeared promising.
Roh, perhaps already sensing upcoming defeat, remarked immediately after local elections in May last year that the right policies would not always appeal to the public, but that his contribution would be revaluated afterwards in a long-term historical perspective.
Predictions made at the start of 2007 have largely been realized during the course of this year. Few surprises have been seen so far. The Grand National Party started with every confidence of winning this year's presidential election. It now appears they could achieve that goal without facing any serious challenge.
After former Gyeonggi-do governor Son Hak-gyu left the GNP in a disagreement over nomination rules, the party was left with two leading presidential candidates: Lee Myung-bak and Park Gun-hae. Lee enjoyed wide recognition for his successful performance as a businessman when he worked for Hyundai, and he built a strong reputation as a business-minded administrator during four years as Seoul mayor from 2002.
Park enjoyed strong party support thanks to the continued popularity of her father, the late former President Park Chung-hee. However, Lee was recognized as a more promising national player and finally selected as the GNP's presidential candidate.
A somewhat different story occurred on the opposite side. The Yulluin-Uri Party could not produce a suitable nominee to compete against the GNP candidate. Trivial battles marred the campaigns of the candidates; they seemed to fall short of posing any sizeable challenge to Lee.
To break the impasse, the Yullin-Uri Party joined forces with other political opponents of the GNP to form the United New Democratic Party. Its candidates included GNP defector Son Hak-gyu, former Yullin-Uri Party Chairman Jung Dong-young and former Education Minister Lee Hae-chan.
Son had a good reputation as a democratic protester and as a skilled administrator as a member of the GNP. Most importantly, his strengths lay in his willingness to inherit the Sunshine Policy and his support of South Korea's free trade agreement with the United States. His choice of polices was aimed at absorbing support from the traditional reformists who had supported the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. There was no doubt that he began the race in an advantageous position.
When Son joined the UNDP, Lee Hae-chan stepped back from the competition and became the chairman of the party's election committee. But Son's political advantages turned out to be no match for Jung Dong-young's ability to unite his constituents effectively. Quite unexpectedly, Son was defeated by Jung in the competition for the party nomination.
While wasting time on these internal struggles, the UNDP lost the opportunity to get geared up to contend with the GNP, during which time Lee reinforced his position inside and outside his party. The UNDP had no time to devise a strategy for the presidential race and was unable to effectively deliver its political vision and policies to voters. The situation grew worse as the UNDP failed in its attempts to form a coalition with the Democratic Party and to ally with other presidential candidates such as Moon Guk-hyun, who is also on the anti-GNP side. More time was wasted.
In this landscape of struggle between the government UNDP and the opposition GNP, the GNP could have seized the victory simply by criticizing the political policies of the Roh administration. But Lee did not think it necessary even to do that, perhaps partly because he didn't want the opposition to bring up his own past policy blunders. These included his "MB doctrine" -- the principle of mutual benefit in granting aid to North Korea -- and a proposed canal project that would have spanned the Korean peninsula. Both proposals prompted serious criticism over their viability.
In fact, the opposition had another strategy to target Lee -- an alleged financial scandal in leveraging stock prices at his former company, BBK, a fund-management company whose title is composed of the three founders' initials. This was obviously a critical moral issue in terms of Lee's qualification to be president. But his opponents could not muster enough political strength to take advantage of Lee's grave weakness. The charge was dismissed after the prosecutor's investigation, prompting public criticism over whether the investigation was thorough enough.
Now that there are just a few days left before the presidential election, it's clear that the current situation won't change and expectations are low. The predictions made about the presidential race at the beginning of this year have materialized through the time-wasting strategies of the administration's political coalition and its failures. In this regard, this year has had nothing to do with political progress.
Fortunately, this situation is not likely to be repeated. Although the regrouping efforts of the anti-GNP group may fail to produce the new president, its moves could still prove meaningful if the newly formed UNDP can consolidate and obtain a substantial number of seats in the National Assembly election, expected in April next year. That would leave the strong probability that the opposition UNDP could push for continued political reform and provide a proper opposition for the GNP and the administration, possibly resulting in more heightened policy competition between the GNP and the UNDP.
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(Lee Jae Young is a freelance writer and citizen reporter for Ohmynews International. He has a master's degree from Cornell University Law School in Ithaca, New York. ©Copyright Lee Jae Young.)
