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In China the victory propaganda continued as usual. People were told of huge victories over the reactionary people of India. The propagandists did not mention that half the Chinese air force stationed in Tibet had ceased to exist. As a matter of fact the Chinese had not lost the war, but neither had they won.
Strategically, in the Bay of Bengal and elsewhere in the Arabian Sea, the Chinese had lost their eyes and ears in terms of lost listening posts. In the air, China's air force had been no match for India's. Indian force multipliers, in terms of AWACS and ECM hardware, had played a decisive role in the Himalayan battle in the spring.
Since the Chinese were not rebuilding their listening posts in the Indian Ocean, India, as a goodwill gesture, vacated the areas it had recaptured from the Chinese in Ladakh -- expecting that the Chinese would also stay out of the area. In fact, they complied. Had India not vacated that area, hostilities would likely have continued off and on, with India threatening China's Aksai Chin Road, it's lifeline between Tibet and Xinjiang province. China could not accept interdiction of that road. Very shortly thereafter a new commander of Chinese forces in Tibet appeared on the scene.
A chance meeting between the Chinese president and Indian prime minister at the United Nations in New York was heralded as a peacemaker. The two agreed to meet again during the spring of 2037 at the G-12 meeting. The subjects for discussion would be their trade relationship, the disputed border areas, China's aid and support to Pakistan and sharing energy resources. The last was in fact the main issue, which had started the latest shooting match.
The new Chinese military commander wished to pursue an aggressive policy and deal a big blow to the Indians. However, political developments overshadowed his plans. He went home to Beijing to attend a meeting of the Central Military Commission, and never returned to Tibet. This was seen as a positive sign for quiet on the border. It was not a peace gesture, except that the Chinese did not wish to pursue an aggressive policy on the border.
The U.S. role, which had strategically tilted the balance against China both in 1962 and in 2036, did not sit well with the Chinese. But the Chinese, being practical people, did not wish to spoil their commercial relations with the United States. Hence they found another way to intimidate both India and the United States.
U.S. and Indian satellites flying over China's Lop Nor nuclear testing facilities picked up unusual activity on the ground. Some key personnel in Beijing, Shanghai and other nuclear facilities were absent in the summer of 2037. Photoreconnaissance also noticed additional concrete structures and tunneling activities.
China was beginning nuclear testing after a lapse of 40 years. Their last underground test was in 1995. They had conducted 45 nuclear tests in all, half of them atmospheric and the other half underground. After the 1995 test they voluntarily suspended all testing in accordance with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The presence of a U.S. nuclear force in the Arabian Sea, although sent to discourage Pakistan from getting involved in hostilities, was taken as an offense by China. The United States had ruined China's grand strategy. Now the Chinese hoped to restore their prestige by testing a newer, more lethal weapon. Surprisingly, they relented under international pressure and bowed out at the last minute.
Economically, China had the world's second largest economy in 2037, the United States being the largest. Its 1.5 billion souls were much more prosperous than they had been 30 years earlier, but matching European or U.S. living standards was still a distant dream. For propaganda purposes they had overbuilt the eastern seaboard, pretending to be at a level equal to the United States. But the Chinese hinterland, where 70 percent of the population lived, remained ravaged by pollution, floods and poverty.
China's military had kept pace with its economic progress. The country was spending close to US$250 billion on defense. But the quality of hardware was mediocre, as sophisticated hardware was not forthcoming from the West or Russia. The West refused to sell advanced weaponry to them and the Russians had also restricted Chinese access to high-tech weapons. The Russians always suspected the Chinese would reverse-engineer their weapons into cheap copies, and would not transfer technology without the payment of license and royalty fees.
India was a bit better off. Its army, air force and navy were half the size of China's, but advanced weaponry was available via Israel, Europe and the United States. The Russians also sold India whatever it needed, with the provision that no copies would be made. India spent less than one-third of what China spent on defense. On the Indo-China border the two armies were about equal; the Chinese had numerical superiority but the Indians had the advantage of high-quality weapons.
India's economy was quite well advanced. It had remained service-oriented, along with the production of high-margin, high-value industrial goods. On the surface Indian cities presented a dull appearance and lacked cleanliness, but overall the economy was in great shape. Indian exports were one-third of China's, but overall margins were much higher. The latter neutralized some of China's advantage.
At best, both economies were developing economies. Both needed outside technology and capital infusions.
At the G-12 meeting of 2038, the Indian prime minister and Chinese president agreed that India and China would not compete or step on each other's toes to get oil and gas. A summit between the two leaders was planned for Singapore in the coming year. Trade and border disputes could be discussed at the summit. A U.S. proposal to refer the border demarcation issue to the International Court of Justice was worth considering.
Four years after the hostilities of 2035-36 ended, trade between India and China was booming again and it was fully balanced. The Chinese balanced their sales to India by buying Indian goods and services for the same amount.
The Indian leadership eagerly awaited a mood swing in public opinion that would allow them to refer the boundary dispute to the international court. Elections were due in 2042 and this could be one of the election issues. If the ruling party lost, this proposal was a no go. But if it won India and China could accept the court's verdict and finally end the border dispute, which had simmered for the lat 80 years.
Would China and India be friends in the future? Only time would tell. With the 2035-36 hostilities, each side had tasted the other's steel and tested each other's resolve. Prolonged hostilities were not beneficial to either side, and it was in the interest of both countries to end them. Issues were still simmering, but efforts to resolve them were underway.
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(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has lived in Canada for the past 34 years. ©Copyright Hari Sud.)
