Font size: 
The president's speech was well crafted to appeal to the emotions of the Sinhalese electorate that voted for him in the November 2005 election. He promised both military victory and a political solution to the ethnic conflict that has been the bane of the country since its independence. But the clear emphasis in the entire ceremony and in the president's speech was on military victory and defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam.
Accepting a parchment recording the victory from the commanders of the armed forces in an archaic ceremony practiced by ancient kings, the president said this glorious chapter would be etched in gold in the annals of the country's history and for many centuries would inspire generations to come. It is clear from the content of his speech that the president was seeking to prevail in the hearts-and-minds battle for the allegiance of the electorate that will keep his government in power.
In addition to congratulating the armed forces for their victory, Rajapaksa used the occasion to pummel his political opponents and to promise greater victories to come. He also strongly criticized the Ceasefire Agreement signed by his main political opponent, former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, with the LTTE, which the president described as a demonic force.
The Ceasefire Agreement signed in February 2002 brought an end to a vicious and escalating war in which the government forces had been forced on the defensive. The agreement recognized the ground reality that parts of the north and east were under LTTE control. But Rajapaksa demonstrated his antipathy for the Ceasefire Agreement, and possibly everything connected with that doomed peace process, saying, "There is no country other than Sri Lanka where the criminal act of conceding a legal area of control to terrorists has been implemented through an agreement."
The extremist position toward which Rajapaksa is gravitating is reflective of the political pressures his government is coming under. Today the electorate that voted for the president is in the process of fragmentation. The government may have been disappointed that the general public did not follow its advice to hoist the national flag in their homes on a large scale.
Even the People's Liberation Front, or JVP -- which is a pro-war party and which gave its fullest support to the president during his election campaign -- drew the line at the victory celebration, replete with military parades and air shows that saw the capital city under tight security surveillance. The JVP criticized the victory celebration as an unwarranted politicization of a costly and hard-fought military victory.
From a different perspective, Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the Muslim Congress, a government ally, excused his own presence at the victory celebration on account of his fear of being seen as opposing the Sri Lankan military. But he made it clear that he felt this victory celebration was anti-Tamil in its orientation, when considering the destruction and displacement Tamil civilians had been subjected to.
In an unprecedented manner, the government sought to infuse schoolchildren with its victory message. It ordered the governmental school system, which reaches millions of children and their parents, to take part in the celebrations. This led to the Bishop of Colombo, Duleep de Chickera, to say that the "indoctrination of trapped school communities through often helpless school authorities" was a serious violation of the vulnerability of children and should be condemned.
It also appears that the president was badly briefed when he charged that Sri Lanka was the only country in the world that had signed a Ceasefire Agreement that recognized lines of control with a rebel group. The peace agreement signed in Sudan in 2005 between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army is a recent example of a ceasefire agreement in which the two sides control territory and keep their armies.
The government's military victory at Thoppigala and the recapture of the east nevertheless has given a temporary respite to the government. In the eyes of many, if not most, people the LTTE is a party that has to be dealt with militarily. The LTTE's past and present intransigence provide a major source of strength to the government's nationalistic and militaristic policies. Many reputed international scholars of conflict resolution believe that the military capacity of the LTTE, and its stranglehold over the territory it controls, need to be reduced for a democratic political solution to become possible in the longer term.
On the other hand, there is a growing consensus both locally and internationally that the government's military campaign by itself will end up dooming the country to a period of escalating bloodshed with no peaceful solution. The government's own efforts to produce a political package have been most unimpressive, as they go back to the district system that was rejected over 25 years ago as inadequate.
The hope of achieving a political solution today is for the Sri Lankan polity, including civil society, to seek the reinvigoration of the All Party Conference process aimed at generating the framework for a lasting political solution. If President Rajapaksa wishes to be truly a part of the solution to the ethnic conflict, he needs to give political leadership to his party in making a liberal-minded contribution to the very All Party Conference process that he established.
--
(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
